Getting soaked?:Climate Crisis, Adaptation Finance, and Racialized Austerity by Bigger, Patrick & Millington, Nate
   
 
1 
PRE-PROOF VERSION- PLEASE REFER TO VERSION-OF-RECORD FOR CITATION 
INFORMATION 
 
Getting soaked? Climate Crisis, Adaptation Finance, and Racialized Austerity 
  
Patrick Bigger, Lancaster University 




As the effects of austerity continue to ravage cities and the impacts of climate change become 
more pronounced, municipal officials around the world are struggling to pay for climate 
adaptation. Some cities have already begun to anticipate the new infrastructures that climate 
change will require, while others have been forced to adapt in real time as climate crises have 
arrived in spectacular ways. Two of the most emblematic events are Superstorm Sandy, which 
drenched New York City in October 2012, and the drought-induced crisis of water scarcity in 
Cape Town, South Africa, which was most visible between 2016 and 2018. In both cases, the 
cities turned to green bonds, a form of municipal finance that foregrounds environmental 
ambitions. In this paper, we track the forms of adaptation projects that green borrowing are 
earmarked to fund. Drawing from scholarship on the financialization of nature alongside recent 
work on racial capitalism and austerity, we find that rather than transformative municipal change 
each city is largely carrying on with projects that reinscribe existing inequalities in the city. In 
addition to reflecting inequalities already present in the two cities, however, the use of municipal 
debt for adaptation intensifies risks, both financial and environmental, borne primary by the poor 
or working class people of color. Building on qualitative fieldwork in Cape Town, New York, and 
across the green bond investment chain, we argue that the risks posed by climate change in the 
city cannot be financialized away. Ultimately, we call for the end of municipal austerity driven by 
national and supranational budgeting choices in favor of increasing national funding of municipal 
adaptation by rescaling borrowing to higher political scales that can more progressively 
distribute risks.   
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1. Cities are increasingly facing challenges posed by climate change in addition to austerity 
and legacies of racialized development. 
2. Some cities are turning to green bonds to finance critical climate adaptation measures. 
3. The use of green debt signals more business as usual than transformational change. 
4. The use of debt to fund adaptation can make cities more, rather than less, risky for its 
most vulnerable inhabitants 
5. Urban political ecology can benefit from blending race, austerity, and financialization as 
topics of inquiry.  
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Cities built for the 20th Century are increasingly reckoning with 21st Century realities. These 
realities cut across social, economic and environmental registers, and a critical confluence lies 
in the question of how to pay for the infrastructure needed to adapt to changing socio-
environmental conditions precipitated by climate change. Municipalities must come to grips not 
only with sea level rise, less predictable weather, and growing urban populations, but also the 
complicated legacies of uneven, often racialized, development in and between cities. The 
funding requirements to adapt to new environmental realities are astronomical, running into the 
hundreds of billions per year globally (UNEP 2016).  
 
Some cities have begun to anticipate the new infrastructure that climate change will require, but 
others have been forced to adapt in real time as climate crises have arrived in spectacular 
ways. Two of the most emblematic events are Superstorm Sandy that drenched New York City 
in October 2012 and the drought-induced crisis of water scarcity in Cape Town, South Africa 
that was most visible between 2016 and 2018. While both cities managed to weather these 
crises at the time, the question of when, not if, the next emergency will arrive stalks municipal 
officials. Further, impacts are still being felt in each city. The New York transit system continues 
to creak through a deepening maintenance crisis exacerbated by storm damage, coupled with a 
deteriorating fiscal outlook. 12,500 kilometers away in Cape Town, the drought and resulting 
water shortages created budgetary shortfalls that need to be made up in the months and years 
to come, complicating an already uneven infrastructural landscape. 
 
In this paper we are interested in how municipal governments in each city have responded, both 
in infrastructure planning and financially, to socio-environmental disaster. When prompted to 
reshape critical infrastructure in the city, leaders largely carried on with existing plans, and opted 
in part to finance those plans using green bonds, a type of debt specifically designated for 
environmental ends. The New York Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA, which manages most 
public transportation1) and the city of Cape Town have been pioneers in the municipal green 
bond market. The bonds issued by MTA and Cape Town are certified to the Climate Bonds 
Standard, which requires the identification of the use of proceeds and an external verification by 
an auditor of those green bonafides. It does not, however, guarantee that any greater 
environmental benefits will accrue than what would have otherwise happened, nor does it 
necessarily impact the cost of capital for borrowers.   
 
In this paper, we argue that the use of green debt for climate change adaptation in cities that are 
already feeling its impact threatens to deepen racialized geographies of financial and 
environmental risk. While Cape Town is perhaps the prototypical case of racialized inequality 
given enduring apartheid spatialities, we note that the constitution and distribution of 
environmental and financial risk play out in broadly similar ways in both cities due to the 
histories and processes through which racial capitalism materializes in specific sites 
(Fredrickson, 1981). Finance does not alter existing geographies and dynamics despite its 
framing as a vehicle for building more resilient cities. As a representative of the Western Cape 
                                               
1 Somewhat confusingly, the MTA is not a city agency, but a New York state agency whose funding is 
derived from state, local, and federal appropriations in addition to fares and tolls. Nonetheless, it is a 
useful example as it operates at the municipal scale and is capable of issuing its own debt.  
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provincial government told us in reference for the need to have functioning infrastructures in 
place before (green) financing can be secured, “if you don’t need the money, you can get it. If 
you need it, you can’t (Interview, October 2018).”  
 
While flippant, this quote gives voice to the central tensions of climate finance across scales, as 
those least responsible for emissions are facing the brunt of the climate crisis. Cape Town’s 
hydroscape is defined not simply by an absolute water shortage but reflects enduring 
inequalities that bifurcates the population into over and under consumers of water (See Rodina, 
2016; Scheba & Millington, 2018; Yates & Harris, 2018). The inequalities of public transportation 
provision in New York are similarly indexed against historical and contemporary social 
difference, as the poor, women, and communities of color disproportionately bear the risks of 
poor transportation access and reliability.  
 
Undoing inequities of service provision that have built up over decades and centuries is not the 
aim of green bonds. Nevertheless, we argue that the turn to capital markets for adaptation 
finance narrows the possibilities for radical changes needed for a just transition. By piling on 
additional debts in which investors generally have senior claims on future revenues, municipal 
borrowing to fund projects that are already in process forecloses more fundamental actions in 
the present and future. While all forms of debt financing inherently constitute and distribute risk, 
we are concerned that the ‘greening’ of municipal debt may occlude retrograde social processes 
that heap addition risks onto those least able to bear them. By this, we mean that the ‘green 
halo’ (Sörqvist et al, 2015) of environmental finance may distract observers not attuned to day-
to-day realities of people who are indelibly dependent on public infrastructure - for example, 
New Yorkers who have few choices for transportation except subways and buses, or 
Capetonians without the means to afford new water tariffs levied in response to the city’s crisis. 
In both cases, crisis response mediated through green debt can leave these communities in 
more, rather than less, risky positions. 
 
At the same time, we stress that these cities, like most, have few good options when it comes to 
paying for adaptation. Decades of austerity, galloping inequality, the spatialization of explicitly 
racist policies, and the costs associated with disaster recovery all impose financial burdens on 
top of already spiraling costs for infrastructure maintenance and provision. As Farnsworth and 
Irving (2012) note, just as there are varieties of capitalism, there are varieties of austerity. While 
marginalized communities in both cities have long suffered infrastructural deprivation in 
comparison to favored parts of each city, the contemporary expression of municipalized 
austerity has distinctly different origins despite outcomes that bear key similarities2. In short, 
many of the effects of austerity and the growing power of financiers in the global economy have 
left city bureaucrats with little recourse to institutions other than capital markets if they are to 
make the best of an impossible situation within existing political-economic arrangements.  
 
Through engagements with scholarship on the financialization of nature and infrastructure, 
sharpened with recent work on racial capitalism, we contribute to discussions about green 
                                               
2 Indeed, the austerity imposed on New York in 1975 offered key lessons for the Bretton Woods 
institutions that would impose structural adjustment on South Africa in the early 1990s (Sonti, 2018) 
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finance and municipal adaptation by exploring how the use of municipal debt for adaptation 
displaces environmental and financial risk onto poor and racialized urbanites. Debt laden 
responses to climate change are amenable to reproducing the conditions that led to crises in the 
first place, maintaining the spatialities of environmental risk already present in the city, but with 
added layers of financial risk. As Prasch (2004) presciently noted regarding financial risks, “we 
have seen, and can expect to continue to see, the systematic shifting of risks toward those who 
cannot afford them, cannot control them, and do not want them” (405, in Christophers et al, 
2019). In societies that are dedicated to responding to climate change under the auspices of 
‘how to change so that nothing really has to change’ (Swyngedouw, 2013), Prasch’s observation 
is as true for environmental risk as it is for financial risk.  
 
In the next section we review literatures in urban political ecology and the financialization of 
nature to help us understand how the use of green municipal finance produces spatialities of 
risk that are intensely localized, produced through difference, and are deepening inequities. 
Following brief discussions of methodology and green bonds, the main sections of the paper 
examine the financial and environmental dynamics of infrastructure and adaptation in Cape 
Town and New York. We focus specifically on the relevant municipal services and their 
relationship to vulnerable and marginalized communities. We describe the role played by debt in 
refashioning the socio-spatialities of risks constituted through historical city-building, austerity, 
climate change, and municipal borrowing. We conclude by reflecting on the implausibility of 
financializing away climate risks, as well as the way that twinned financial and environmental 
risk serve to magnify the risks unwillingly borne by the poor, women, people of color, and 
immigrants. We argue that better solutions lie in reversing national and supranational austerity 
and shifting the scales of financing adaptation upward. Political scales capable of enacting more 
progressive taxation and borrowing on more favorable terms should raise the funding, which 
would be distributed to cities for democratic adaptation planning and implementation.   
 
We aim to make two contributions with this paper. First, with inspiration from recent critiques of 
neoliberal natures (see Lave, 2018), we document the impacts of green bonds, which have 
been understudied despite their growing prominence and widespread effects (for exceptions, 
see Bracking, 2015, Christophers et al, 2019). Second, we bring austerity into view alongside 
both the financialization of nature and racial capitalism. Austerity has barely featured in the 
neoliberal natures literature, and racial capitalism has only recently featured in an otherwise 
vibrant research community (Bigger and Dempsey, 2018). Urban political ecology has made a 
more sustained investigation of racialized natures, but it has had less to say about 
financialization (Christophers, 2018). Our intent is to facilitate dialogue between these evolving 
literatures.    
    
Austerity, finance, race, nature 
 
To make sense of convergent outcomes in apparently divergent spaces, our analysis builds on 
work about contemporary dynamics of the financialization of nature (Ouma et al, 2018) and 
urban infrastructure (Langley, 2018). We read financialization alongside studies of racial 
capitalism (Bledsoe and Wright, 2019) and urban governance, particularly a nascent literature 
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around municipal austerity, race, and the environment (Ranganathan, 2016; Pulido, 2016), as 
well as work in urban political ecology that reflects the raced dynamics in the production of 
urban natures more broadly (Dillon, 2014; Heynen, 2016; Katz, 2008; Pulido, 2000). Our work 
through the raced and classed3 risks that structure and are reflected in Cape Town and New 
York’s use of green bonds contributes to lively conversations about the financialization of 
nature, urban climate adaptation, and the articulation of environmental injustices under racial 
capitalism.  
 
From the outset of the 2007 financial crisis (e.g. Smith, 2007), critics have warned that new 
financial interventions in environmental management may represent techno-natural fixes for 
capitalism (Swyngedouw, 2013). The fix of rendering environments investable is meant to solve 
capital’s twin crises of overaccumulation (Bond, 2012) and the increasingly urgent second 
contradiction of capital wherein capital destroys its own capacity to reproduce the conditions of 
its reproduction (O’Connor 1996, Moore 2015). This narrative has faced increasing push-back in 
recent years, with authors like Dempsey and Suarez (2016), Christophers (2015), and Ouma 
(2015), questioning the extent to which nature is meaningfully ‘financialized’, or indeed the 
transformative potential of green finance in general.  
 
Lave (2018) argues that many scholars have been seduced by the complexity and apparent 
novelty of environmental finance while overlooking innumerable instances of less exotic, but 
more damaging, environmental injustices. We are sympathetic to Lave’s concerns, and in many 
ways this paper confirms them. But we also think that green bonds are quantitatively distinct 
from the types of investigations Lave identifies as having served the purpose of demonstrating 
that, “there is very little ‘neo’ in neoliberal natures” (2018, 55). Global green bond issuance grew 
to around US$160 billion in 2018 (CBI, 2019). While other forms of environmental finance are 
decidedly marginal (Dempsey & Suarez, 2016; Bigger & Dempsey, 2018), both in dollar terms 
and environmental impact4, green bonds are poised to become a mainstream asset class, 
reflecting the types of responses to climate change that capital, capitalist states, and 
supranational lenders identify as most investable, and therefore, actionable.   
 
We find that finance thrives not only on homogenization or the erasure of difference, as has 
been the argument in much of the neoliberal natures literature (e.g Robertson, 2006; 
MacKenzie, 2009), but also on differentiation. We could start as far back as the production of 
race as a modern category in the birth of not only Anglo-American financial capital (Baucom, 
2005), but capitalist world ecology more broadly (Patel & Moore, 2017). The longue durée of 
financial capital accumulation, from the slave trade to the securitization bonanza in mortgage 
backed securities that helped precipitate the subprime crisis (Ashton 2012), was achieved, at 
                                               
3 Risk embedded in urban service provision and infrastructure is also intrinsically gendered. Women, and 
women of color in particular, are more reliant on public transportation for wage and reproductive labor, so 
both financial and environmental risks are experienced more acutely by women, who comprise around 
60% of subway trips (Saska, 2015). Water access in Cape Town is acutely gendered as well (see Harris 
et al, 2017; Sultana, 2018).   
4 Though these interventions often have detrimental social outcomes for impacted communities 
regardless of their economic or environmental failures (see Asiyanbi, 2018; Chomba et al, 2016; Beymer-
Ferris & Basset, 2012). 
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least in part, through racial differentiation and exploitation. These practices of accumulation shot 
through with racialized dispossession have been so successful that there now exists a ‘wall of 
money’ seeking profitable investment. Meanwhile, municipal, national, and international 
inequality has reach staggering new depths; green bonds are promoted as a way for the wall of 
money to mitigate the environmental consequences of previous rounds of accumulation (see 
also Rosenman, 2019 for other asset classes that turn on this logic).   
 
At the same time, neighborhoods, cities, and nation states are starved of capital for day-to-day 
maintenance or the expansion of vital services, never mind transformative infrastructural 
retrofits that could produce inclusive communities less exposed to environmental and economic 
risks. In cities, this starvation has been produced through racially-explicit infrastructural 
deprivation and municipal austerity that forces cities to make difficult choices. These processes 
are further complicated by environmental change. Adaptation needs impose additional costs on 
cities and drives them to increased borrowing and service charges, fueling a cycle of 
indebtedness and intensifying spatialities of risk. While other studies of financialization have 
linked state austerity across juridical scales to the introduction of financial practices and logics in 
governance (Peck, 2012), links between austerity and the financialization of nature have been 
notable in their absence (Bigger & Dempsey, 2018; but see Calvário et al, 2017). 
 
As urban climate policy becomes increasingly interwoven with finance capital, the forms through 
which those policies are articulated are globally significant (Long & Rice, 2019). Attention to the 
specific forms of those changes is critical if we are to contest looming eco-apartheid prefigured 
by the constitution and distribution of environmental/economic risk (Cohen, 2017). This interest, 
in turn, leads us back to recent work on racial capitalism, and how the meteoric growth of 
financial markets and deployments of financial logics (in ‘nature’ and otherwise) are not simply 
an economic phenomenon, but are intensely social-spatial processes to which racism and white 
supremacy, historical and contemporary, are inextricably bound (Kish & Leroy, 2015). If urban 
austerity in and through nature is marked by a bio/necro-politics of abandonment articulated 
through race (McIntyre and Nast, 2011; Ranganathan 2016) while the extent and intensification 
of financialization also operates through race (Arestis et al, 2013), it stands to reason that 
financial responses to urban climate crises will be shot through with racialized dynamics of risk.  
 
Paying attention to dynamics of ‘green’ finance has implications not just for work in political 
ecology but also for understanding contemporary urban governance in an era of deepening 
austerity, climate crisis, and what Long and Rice (2019) call “climate urbanism.” Climate finance 
offers unique insight into contemporary governance challenges facing cities and municipalities 
(Buckley, 2010). While Lave (2018) is right that much of the focus on environmental finance has 
prioritized novelty over effect, the degree to which cities are positioned as the primary actors 
within climate change adaptation and mitigation is increasingly hard to overstate and suggests 
the need for critical inquiry into the everyday dynamics of municipal budgeting in multi-scalar 
contexts of austerity (Long & Rice, 2019). Therefore, our arguments are pointed as much 
towards contemporary articulations of urban governance as they are towards work on neoliberal 
natures.  
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Ultimately, our interest is in the role of debt for urban adaptation to unfolding crises. In both New 
York and Cape Town, we find that the ability to manage environmental risks is increasingly 
mediated by financial logics, for both municipal officials and urbanites. However, we are dubious 
that the designation of debt as ‘green’ meaningfully alters this dynamic, though labeling can help 
us see how these practices play out. Cities are facing serious challenges prompted by 
environmental change and absent significant political change no amount of earmarked debt for 
adaptation will fundamentally reshape broader urban riskscapes in egalitarian ways. Instead we 
argue that adaptation in the city cannot be reduced to questions of municipal fiscal management 
and requires sustained investment from other fiscal scales coupled with systemic changes to 
how risks, environmental and economic, are produced and distributed.    
 
Methodology   
 
This paper builds on fieldwork in Cape Town and New York. Drawing from Hart’s model of 
relational comparison and intersectional understandings of the differentiated effects of socio-
environmental crisis, we begin not from bounded geographical units but instead “vantage points” 
where “critical ethnography and spatio-historical analysis of conjunctures and interconnections” 
(389) can shed light on shared processes and practices (Hart, 2006, 2016). Differentiating her 
approach from existing tendencies in Southern Urbanism through its dialectical approach, Hart 
describes a conjunctural move that involves “bringing key forces at play in South Africa and 
other regions of the world into the same frame of analysis, as connected yet distinctively 
different nodes in globally interconnected historical geographies – and as sites in the production 
of global processes in specific spatio-historical conjunctures, rather than as just recipients of 
them,” (373). As such, our interest is not in comparative urbanism per se, but rather is oriented 
around specific processes that both materialize in, and are constituted by, specific places.  
 
From this perspective, we understand Cape Town and New York as nodes that both respond to, 
but also produce, specific processes and outcomes. These processes include experiences of 
austerity and climate crisis, ongoing dynamics of racialized dispossession, and the use of new 
financial instruments to fund climate change adaptation. Our choice to narrate green finance 
from cities that cut across north-south binaries draws from the convergence of two ongoing 
research projects and is oriented toward a conjunctural method that looks for patterns and 
overlapping processes across north/south binaries rather than sees southern cities as failed 
models of northern examples (Chattopadhyay, 2012; Lawhon et al, 2016; Millington & Lawhon, 
2018; Robinson, 2016; Roy, 2005, 2009, 2017).  
 
In Cape Town, interviews were conducted with representatives of municipal and provincial 
governments knowledgeable about the city’s budget, climate finance, and climate change 
adaptation strategy as well as private sector representatives with knowledge about green 
finance in South Africa. Additional interviews were conducted with both private sector and 
national government representatives in Gauteng province, with specific emphasis on climate 
finance and the green economy more broadly. All interviews were conducted in person, with one 
exception that was conducted over Skype. The second author was based in Cape Town from 
January 2017 until August 2018, working primarily on a project about water and waste 
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infrastructure in Cape Town. In New York, interviews were conducted in October 2018 via 
phone with municipal transportation officials and bankers. These interviews were informed by 12 
in-person interviews with key actors in the global green bond market in London, Copenhagen, 
and Brussels between December 2016 and January 2018 during the first author’s research on 
the global green bonds market. Though we do not draw extensively from interviews for direct 
quotations in our analysis here, we use them to contextualize and verify extensive primary 
document and newspaper archival analysis. Where we do draw on information learned from 





Labeled green debt was the domain of development banks until 2014, when municipalities and 
corporations began borrowing for less carbon intensive projects. By the end of 2017, annual 
green bond issuance exceeded US$160 billion, nearly topping all other types of finance 
explicitly designated to mitigate or adapt to climate change combined. For example, global 
carbon market allowances value across all compliance markets stood around US$40 billion in 
2016, while much hyped mechanisms like REDD+ carbon offsets or multilateral pools of capital 
like the Green Climate Fund appear as drops in the bucket of climate finance, never mind 
financial markets more broadly (Bigger & Dempsey, 2018). Green bonds increasingly form a 
component of mainstream investment portfolios and help define what kinds of climate change 
related projects get funded (Bracking, 2015). There are many reasons for the growth of any 
financial asset class, but here we identify three factors that contribute to the growth of green 
bonds before discussing their shortcomings. 
 
First, bonds are boring. In the wake of a financial crisis perceived to have been fomented by 
complex financial engineering, boring is good. Boring is doubly good in climate finance where 
other mechanisms, like carbon allowances, are viewed as beholden to regulatory fiat and 
without benchmarks, making them difficult to assess as an investment product (Verifier 
interview, London, August 2017). In comparison, green bonds are exactly like normal bonds, so 
big institutional investors like pension funds already have mountains of data for assessment 
(Bigger, 2017). Proponents of green bonds claim that if even a sliver of all bonds were 
‘greened’, the funding gaps for the provision of urban infrastructure designed for the rigors of 
climate change could be filled overnight (CBI, n.d.). These proponents are the second reason 
for the growth of green bonds. Groups like the Climate Bonds Initiative have played a critical 
role in convincing issuers to label their debt, for institutional purchasers to seek out labeled debt, 
and for intermediaries to develop market devices like indices for measuring green bonds 
(Tripathy 2017).  
 
Third, there is legitimate interest among some debt buyers for investment grade bonds that 
have a credible claim to creating environmental benefits. Big buyers like California’s public 
pensions have engaged issuers to encourage offerings that conform to the buyers’ preferred 
financial risk profiles. (Interview, pension fund ESG officer, Copenhagen, September 2017) 
Officials in Cape Town and New York reported that labelling increased orders for debt as new 
   
 
9 
investors are attracted to bonds they might not have previously considered (Issuer interviews, 
October 2018). That increasing interest by new buyers will ‘crowd in’ green finance is one of the 
animating hypothesis of green bond advocates; when labelled green debt outperforms 
unlabeled debt, green bonds will create a pricing premium. In turn, this would lower the cost of 
environmentally-conscious projects and create a ‘virtuous cycle’ of more and more green 
projects (Reichelt and Keenan 2017). While there is preliminary evidence that this ‘greenium’ 
may be starting to emerge (Partridge and Medda, 2018) research participants in Cape Town’s 
municipal finance division, in New York directly involved with the MTA’s green borrowing, and 
other market interlocutors in Copenhagen and London expressed skepticism that any such 
discount existed. Indeed, with added costs of verifying the environmental criteria of a bond, 
issuance may be more, rather than less, expensive. This echoes Christophers’ (2018) 
observation that the use of exotic green financial mechanisms in Washington D.C. actually 
increased borrowing costs for utilities, and hence for ratepayers.  
 
These added expenses with no guaranteed price premium are just two of the shortcomings we 
might attribute to green bonds. Additionally, while some green bonds are certified to comply with 
standards that have developed, there are no legal definitions of ‘green’ in green bonds. The 
failure to achieve stated environmental goals in any issuance is legally unpunishable. Further, 
and more directly relevant to the story we want to tell, green labeling does not entail any 
promise that funding raised will be more environmentally beneficial than what would have 
happened otherwise; in the language of carbon markets, there is not necessarily any 
additionality. This means that green debt can be, and frequently is, used to pay for projects that 
have already been completed by refinancing bank debt, or pay for projects that are already 
planned. This is the case in both New York and Cape Town, where green bonds have largely 
refinanced existing debt. 
 
Debtor utilities, vulnerable communities 
 
The situations in New York and Cape Town are broadly similar, but the details vary significantly. 
In this section we will discuss the conditions that led to the issuance of green debt as a 
response to twinned environmental and fiscal crises, and the risks they are constituting and 
distributing.  
 
We locate moments of highly visible crisis--Superstorm Sandy and Cape Town’s water crisis--
within longer crisis genealogies. This perspective has ramifications for how we might think of 
adaptation’s entwining with financial management. Herein lies a distinction between Cape Town 
and New York, but also reflects the generalizability of our observations. New York’s mass transit 
system was ‘financialized’ from its genesis, as the various subway lines were built by the city 
and then leased to private operators (Hood, 2004). The system was subsequently brought 
under state ownership in the 1940s, but by the early 1980s was taking on ever increasing debt 
while government appropriations waned. Meanwhile in South Africa, a deteriorating fiscal 
situation due to economic downturn and ongoing political uncertainty means that municipalities 
are increasingly encouraged to find new sources of funding, especially for new projects (SACN 
2018). Debt finance, including green bonds, is one such revenue source.  




The similarities between Cape Town and New York include legacies of explicit segregation and 
inequitable provision of urban services, the need to (re)produce infrastructure that can respond 
to the rigors of a changed climate, and tight budgets exacerbated by decades of racialized 
austerity for some parts of each city, followed by more generalized austerity. Our analysis is 
aimed at discerning the regimes of risks that are produced and magnified through the use of 
municipal debt for adaptation. Here, we build on insights from Christopher’s (2018)5 analysis of 
bonds that financed Washington D.C.’s sewage system refurbishment. Christophers argues 
that, “the crystallization of these [environmental and financial] risks is likely to have deleterious 
consequences particularly for local residents, who are the ultimate social bearers of those risks 
both as inhabitants of the environment and, through the payment of... fees and charges, as the 
principal funders of the latter’s debt servicing obligations,” (146). We extend this argument by 
demonstrating the socio-spatial differentiation of risk bearing produced using green bonds for 
climate adaptation. ‘Inhabitants of the environment’ do not bear environmental and financial 
risks equally, and the distribution of those risks breaks down on well-worn raced and classed 
lines.   
 
New York: Managing austerity with debt 
 
In the summer of 2017, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo announced that the New York 
subway system was in a state of emergency (Fitzsimmons 2017). Given the magnitude of the 
damage to the subway system created by Superstorm Sandy in 2012, estimated at around $5 
billion dollars, one might suppose the storm was the proximate cause of a lingering crisis 
(Hinds, 2012). Sandy certainly contributed to reliability problems that saw on-time performance 
slip to 58% in early 2018 (Hu, 2018), but the roots of the transportation crisis can be traced back 
to New York’s fiscal crisis of the 1970s (Harvey 2005). Since the early 1970’s, MTA has see-
sawed between financial famine and comparative feast. Each successive renaissance, 
however, has come with the burden of more debt as relative state appropriations fell, fares rose, 
antiquated signaling degraded, and the system was rendered unprepared - both physically and 
financially - for an external shock like Sandy. Further, no matter which way the scales tipped, 
critical parts of the infrastructure continued to age, and inequalities of provision and access 
persisted.  
 
New York’s unequal provision of transportation infrastructure is built into the fabric of the city. 
Transportation, as much as redlining or restrictive covenants, was and is a key component to 
the spatialization of race in the city (see Winner 1980). Robert Moses, New York’s City Planning 
Commissioner (among his many titles) throughout the mid-20th Century, promoted auto-led 
                                               
5 In addition to the pay-for-performance ‘Environmental Impact Bond’ worth US$25 million that 
Christophers (2018) examines, D.C. Water has been a large issuer of the sort of green bonds under 
consideration in this article to the tune of more than US$500 million. Given Washington D.C.’s well 
documented history of segregation (Manning 2010), municipal austerity (Debonis, 2011), racially-inflected 
gentrification (Prince 2016), and, now, use of green bonds, Washington D.C. is precisely the type of city 
that our analysis may help interpret as the impacts of climate change - or preparations for those impacts - 
become more visible and debts for those interventions mount. 
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development, which often had racially deleterious consequences. An infamous racist, Moses 
was responsible for vast demolitions and dispossessions targeting neighborhoods of color; up to 
500,000 people were displaced, directly, or indirectly, by Moses’s ‘slum clearance’ (Caro, 1974). 
These dispossessions facilitated the construction of motorways that eased (white) auto-
commuting from suburbs while displacing communities of color to further-flung parts of the 
boroughs with less access to public transit. The processes of displacement, redlining, and the 
transformation of neighborhoods Moses perceived as slums into actual slums, as in Sunset 
Park, Brooklyn, contributed to the racial unrest of the 1960s (Freilla, 2004). This, in turn, was 
followed by new rounds of disinvestment in those neighborhoods, helping format New York’s 
contemporary spatiality of inequality. 
 
Now, even the parts of the city that are historically well served by transportation suffer from 
reliability issues. For some New Yorkers, the subway’s poor on-time performance is merely an 
annoyance (if a vexing one). But for low income workers, often women, people of color, and 
immigrants who rely exclusively on public transportation, a late train can mean losing a job, 
missing a doctor’s appointment for which they will be charged, or sending a child to disciplinary 
proceedings for tardiness. This is especially true for service industry workers (again, primarily 
women and people of color), whose transportation needs are even less well served than New 
Yorkers who travel during peak hours. The flexibilization of work has not been matched by an 
increase in trains and busses during non-peak times (Stringer 2018). In this way, the risks 
produced by the subway system crises of maintenance and funding, inflected by Sandy’s 
damage to the system, are unevenly borne across axes of social difference.  
 
Following the municipal financial crisis that was part of the wider economic downturn in the early 
1970s the New York transit system infamously fell into disrepair, especially the subway. 
Graffitied MTA trains became synonymous with racialized urban blight (Dickinson 2008), and 
with the U.S ‘urban crisis’ more generally. When MTA began to dig itself out of the hole created 
by austerity in 1981, it did so both through marginally higher state appropriations and through 
expanded borrowing powers (Rivera, 2008). In 1981, MTA carried no long-term debt; by 1999 
outstanding debt stood at US$17.5 billion (Rivera, 2008). Debt levels stabilized briefly, but in 
2002 the debt was restructured, dramatically prolonging the repayment period on existing debt 
(NY Torch 2010). This meant greater capital availability and increased headroom for further 
borrowing in the short term, but the trade-off was an ever-increasing debt burden that would be 
borne by multiple generations of transit users. Debt issued in the early 1990s would not be paid 
off until 2032 (Rivera 2008).  
 
Following the 2002 restructuring, MTA’s debt load began to grow even more rapidly, reaching 
nearly US$30 billion in 2009 (PCAC 2012), an increase of nearly 60% in a decade, and a pace 
which MTA has maintained. Including its $6.2 billion in green bonds, MTA debt now stands at 
nearly $50 billion. Debt service is MTA’s second largest cost after labor and is growing at twice 
the rate (Braun 2018). Because of this deteriorating financial situation, MTA’s credit rating was 
downgraded in August 2018 to A by Standard and Poor’s, closer to non-investment grade than 
prime (Scaggs 2018). This, perversely, will further raise borrowing costs on future issuances, 
exacerbating the austerity-fueled hole in which it finds itself. 




To address challenges of funding and to highlight the positive environmental impacts of mass 
transit, in 2016 MTA turned to what was at the time a relatively untested tool to finance its 
operating expenses and capital spending in the form of its initial green bond offering. The 
issuance came on the heels of MTA’s ‘fix and fortify’ program in the wake of Sandy that 
identified critical upgrades needed in indispensable parts of the system. Observers reckon that 
the ‘fix’ part of the program, which was paid for primarily through US federal disaster recovery 
funds, went reasonably well, though it is difficult to parse in light of the overarching maintenance 
crisis (DeMause 2016). However, the ‘fortify’ part of the equation has been much slower to 
materialize, remaining an aspiration tied to MTA’s underfunded capital budget. To fund fixes and 
fortifications, while also simply raising enough capital to keep transit running, MTA has 
continued to issue debt, much of which now bears a green label. MTA offers half of each bond 
issuance to retail investors, and even conducts marketing campaigns in stations for some 
issuances (Interview with MTA official, October 2018). Part of this marketing effort around the 
green bond was to entice younger buyers, as millennials are thought to be shifting toward 
‘impact investing’, or investments that promise to deliver desirable social or environmental 
outcomes (Interview with MTA official, October 2018). 
 
As Rosenman (2019) and Kish and Leroy (2015) demonstrate, impact investing (of which green 
bonds might be considered a part) is a way that the life chances of the poor and people of color 
come to be further imbricated with financial logics. Offering bonds to retail investors, and 
advertising them to commuters is, in effect, a way for New Yorkers with investable income to 
extract rents from New Yorkers dependent on public transportation. Given that a substantial 
proportion of the 60% of New Yorkers who live paycheck-to-paycheck are also reliant on mass 
transit (Afridi 2016), and the majority of ridership is women, people of color and immigrants 
(Kabak 2010, Saska 2015), the use of debt to fund mass transit operations represents an intra-
urban reverse subsidy where the poor and communities of color indirectly transfer rents to 
people with investable money. Meanwhile, these communities disproportionately bear the 
environmental risks of the next storm. People with investable income are more likely to be able 
to afford other means of transportation in response to crises of mobility, both ordinary and 
extraordinary, particularly through on-demand ride hailing, the growth of which is driving down 
subway ridership (Colon 2018). The combination of unreliable service and taxi deregulation is 
fueling what was recently pronounced a “death spiral” (Durkin 2018) as the maintenance crisis 
drives middle class riders to ride hailing apps, in turn reducing fare revenues, leading to further 
constrained budgets and deteriorating borrowing conditions, and, ultimately to fare rises and 
further borrowing. That is without adding the next storm into the equation.    
 
Cape Town: Municipal Autonomy and Household Debt Impairment 
 
Cape Town is marked by enduring and dramatic inequality materialized in the city’s 
infrastructures (Jaglin 2008). While the inability to access drinkable water is statistically 
insignificant, the everyday dynamics of water access are more complex given the city’s highly 
differentiated urban form. As Rodina (2016) makes clear, accessing water in the city is 
complicated by broader dynamics of informality, insecurity, and uneven tenure. The city has 
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made impressive strides in extending water provisioning, but the intensity of segregation and 
inequality in the city means that consistent water access is a challenge for many, especially 
when access overlaps with broader dynamics of insecurity, informality, and indebtedness.  
 
These dynamics were pushed to their limit between 2016 and 2018, when the city of Cape 
Town reached the precipice of a water crisis that nearly resulted in citywide rationing under the 
specter of ‘Day Zero.’ The city was narrowly able to avoid a full-scale crisis of water delivery 
through huge reductions in personal water consumption by urban residents, the negotiating of 
significant water transfers from the agricultural sector, and, ultimately, the return of rain. 
Reductions in personal water usage were unprecedented: Capetonians reduced their water 
footprint by roughly 50% over the course of two years through a combination of punitive tariffs, 
voluntary reductions, and technical approaches including pressure reductions in pipes (For an 
overview of the crisis and the municipal response, see Ziervogel, 2019).6  
 
The city’s water crisis quickly became a financial crisis. Declining revenues resulting from 
reduced water consumption created a complex fiscal situation for the city, as the crisis reduced 
the city’s revenue, inhibiting cross-subsidization. Roughly 10% of the city’s operating budget 
comes from water tariffs. In early 2018 the city proposed a drought levy to make up for reduced 
income from tariffs because of the crisis. This levy would have subsidized the budget through a 
system based not on water usage but on property values. A complex coalition of rich and poor 
actors aggressively pushed back, arguing that the proposal unfairly affected residents who had 
lowered their water consumption considerably. The levy was scrapped (Kamaldien, 2018). As a 
result, the city released a budget that included a significant increase in water cost, with tiered 
pricing based on water usage. This budget has since been walked back as restrictions on water 
usage have relaxed, with residents now being allowed to use 100 litres per person (versus 50 at 
the height of the crisis). While the new tariffs were politically unpopular, they were justified as 
being necessary due to the combined situation of reduced water income and increased costs 
due to augmentation.  
 
The city’s water crisis fits into a longer dynamic of increased pressure on the municipality from 
continued in-migration (often to informal settlements), worries about water availability due to 
climate change, and limited federal investment in the water sector. South African municipalities 
have a hlarge degree of financial autonomy, especially in the domains of human settlement 
(including water) and public transportation. This gives municipalities license to operate semi-
independently, but also requires they find ways of funding their operations. The bulk of 
municipal revenues comes from their own revenue streams, mainly service charges and 
property taxes (SACN, 2018: ii). In Cape Town, for the budget year 2016/2017, 82% of the city’s 
revenues came from their own sources (SACN, 2018: 7). Gaps in revenue that are available to 
municipalities to fund infrastructure and critical services are growing, however, and 
municipalities are being increasingly encouraged by national government to increase their 
borrowing. The Development Bank of South Africa’s Municipal Infrastructure Investment 
                                               
6 Research and analysis of Cape Town’s water crisis was conducted in collaboration with Suraya Scheba 
(See Scheba & Millington, 2018). 
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Framework has outlined the capital requirements for South Africa’s municipal services, including 
water supply (See Palmer et al, 2017: 142). In the case of water supply, the estimated capital 
needs roughly double the actual capital spent, and municipal funding gaps are expected to grow 
in the next decade (See SACN, 2018: v). As Palmer et al (2017) note, “[T]here remains a gap in 
the availability of capital that applies across the municipal spectrum. This...means that poor 
households are deprived of adequate services, and too many are left to live in underserved 
informal settlements and depressed rural settlements (156). The use of debt finance is one 
means of plugging this gap. 
  
The City of Cape Town issued a green bond in July 2017. While issued in the midst of the water 
crisis, the decision to issue a green bond formed part of the city’s longer-term strategy to issue 
bonds in recognition of declining financial resources at the federal level (Interview with Western 
Cape provincial government employee, October 2018) In describing the bond itself, 
representatives of the treasury department noted that its issuance was part of the then-mayor’s 
strategy to articulate a green strategy in the years preceding the crisis (Interview with 
Representatives of Cape Town Treasury Department, July 2018). The extra cost of processing 
the bond was justified as a material demonstration of the city’s commitment to green ambitions. 
As the city possesses comparatively high rates of creditworthiness in relation to other 
municipalities in South Africa, accessing capital presents little difficulty for the city (Interview 
with Western Cape provincial government employee, October 2018). As such, bonds have 
proved an effective means of raising capital in the context of federal austerity, economic 
slowdown, and political conflicts between the Democratic Alliance (who govern the Western 
Cape) and the African National Congress (who govern at the national level).   
 
Interviews with treasury department representatives suggest that projects were largely selected 
post hoc; once a decision to use a green bond had been made, the challenge was then to locate 
projects that fit the criteria (Interview with Representatives of Cape Town Treasury Department, 
July 2018). As a result, the bond has largely been used to refinance existing projects and 
infrastructures, which were discovered through an audit of the city’s existing projects. The funds 
are mainly directed towards water supply infrastructure for improvements to reservoirs, 
alongside the development of technologies to give the city more control over the water system, 
heightening the city’s ability to reduce water pressure and therefore usage, and reduce water 
losses from leaks. Critically, significant funding from the green bond is earmarked for the 
continued installation of household flow regulators or water management devices (WMDs). 
WMDs form a significant component of the city’s strategy to manage demand as well as pursue 
household debt recovery through the ability to restrict residents’ water usage electronically. 
They deliver an allotment of water before cutting off, resetting the next day. They are designed 
to regulate water demand while also minimizing household debt. Starting in 2001, all South 
African citizens have been guaranteed at least 25 litres of water per person per day or 6 
kilolitres per household per month as part of the county’s Free Basic Water (FBW) program 
(Enqvist & Ziervogel, 2019; Yates & Harris, 2018). WMDs are designed to provide FBW water 
while ensuring that residents to not use more water than they can afford. The rollout of WMDs 
began in 2007, and roughly 250,000 have been installed since (Roeland, 2018; Yates & Harris, 
2018). Of these, roughly 160,000 have been installed in homes deemed indigent, often in the 
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city’s racialized peripheries and townships through a compulsory program linked to eventual 
debt clearance and the fixing of leaks (Roeland, 2018).   
 
The relationship between WMDs and debt recovery involves a complex conjoining of demand 
management with debt recovery on behalf of the city, one that is deepened through green debt 
financing. As Yates and Harris (2018) make clear, the central preoccupation of Cape Town’s 
water demand management reduction policies, “have been as much about cost recovery as 
they have been about drought mitigation - until recently the City targeted indebted households 
rather than high volume consumers in general” (81). The installation of WMDs is increasingly 
linked to a changing regulatory understanding of FBW. While the first 6 kilolitres per household 
per month was previously delivered free of charge, all water is now chargeable on a tiered basis 
(Yates & Harris, 2018: 79). For residents to receive their free water, they need to register as 
indigent (and re-register every 12 months). Registration, however, can be burdensome, 
requiring residents to prove their poverty (Socio-economic Rights Institute 2013: 44). As a 
result, Yates and Harris (2018) estimate that many indigent households are not formally 
registered. Indigent households cannot refuse the installation of WMDs.  
 
The relationship between debt recovery, debt financing, and demand management suggests 
that an uptick in municipal borrowing will deepen patterns of racialized austerity that are already 
being felt in poor households. Cape Town’s green bond has facilitated a series of technical 
responses to water scarcity through water commercialization. Activist organizations like the 
Water Crisis Coalition have argued that WMDs disproportionately impact poor households due 
to their installation in homes where water bills have gone unpaid. While WMDs are designed to 
hold people to their allotted FBW - and in this sense are formally in line with South Africa’s 
constitution - the intersection of WMDs with other inequalities complicates this simple 
calculation. Residents of townships and informal settlements often subdivide their homes and 
rent out their backyards as an income generating strategy in the context of extreme 
unemployment, and so household sizes may vary considerably. As such, many who are in 
possession of WMDs are at risk receiving less water than their guaranteed allotments due to 
overlapping infrastructures of informality and inequality (Socio-Economic Rights Institute 2013: 
64). Additionally, WMDs are marked by breakdown and uncertainty, and residents regularly 
complain about their functionality, flagging the similar if differentiated crises of urban 




Across many cities, the present conjuncture is marked by a toxic blend of racialized inequality, 
environmental change, and municipal austerity, inviting considerations of who bears which risks, 
and to what degree. In these cases, municipal water users in Cape Town and New Yorkers 
dependent on public transportation find themselves doubly at risk. First, they are endangered by 
increasing climate instability that threatens to disrupt the provision of essential public services, 
rendering access to water or transit more difficult, if not impossible. At the same time, residents 
are financially endangered as growing debt burdens, increasing costs of borrowing associated 
with credit rating downgrades and global interest rate increases, and rising rates or fares to pay 
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for each are applied to service users who have no other options. While the wealthier can opt 
out, as they do in New York through the increasing use of ride hailing apps, and in Cape Town 
as the rich are able to buy virtually unlimited supplies of bottled water, the poor are locked into 
paying for the service, and in turn contribute to the rents extracted by each utilities’ creditors.    
 
Quotidian struggles around access reflect elaborations of twinned environmental and financial 
risk, and marginalized communities who are endangered through the risks manifested through 
the issuance of debt, green or not. Previously, the novelty of green finance may have been 
overstated, and been, in the grand scheme of capital’s production of nature, a ‘nonevent’ (Lave 
2018). A focus on municipal finance, however, as a mechanism through which responses to 
climate crisis is materializing, can render apparent the deep linkages between finance, austerity, 
and inequality in cities. This leads us to tentatively suggest that there is evidence that the role 
played by climate finance may be deepening. At the same time, we emphasize that new forms 
of finance or municipal governance are not producing entirely new socio-environmental 
outcomes, but are intensifying existing inequities of service provision and associated economic 
and environmental risks for marginalized communities.  
 
In New York, conservative think tanks and some in the media are pinning the blame for rising 
costs and the maintenance crisis on workers’ salaries and pensions, signaling increased risks 
for workers through new rounds of austerity and calls for union busting (e.g. Gelinas, 2011). 
This is doubly significant because of the demographic profile of New York transit workers. In 
2007, 70% of transportation workers were people of color; African Americans constituted more 
than 40% of the workforce despite being a quarter of the city’s population at the same time 
(LMIS, 2009). Meanwhile, the median annual earnings for MTA employees was around 
US$90,000 per year in 2015 (Knocke 2016), significantly higher than most blue-collar jobs. 
Therefore, any attack on workers is explicitly an attack on communities of color, who will be 
disproportionately impacted by job losses or cuts to pay and benefits. By pursuing adaptation 
through debt rather than broad based taxation at the federal and state level to fund radically 
increased appropriation to the system, the books will be balanced on the backs of the workers 
and transit users just as the financial and ecological books are being balanced on the back of 
the racialized poor in Cape Town.   
 
This follows a broader pattern of the racialized impacts of austerity. Federal austerity in the US 
has transcalar impacts because of the importance of intergovernmental transfers. Austerity has 
hastened the shift from government to governance, a well-trod feature of neoliberalization more 
broadly (Peck 2012); a less well explored dimension is who lost jobs as parts of the state have 
contracted. Given that federal and some states desegregated work early compared to much of 
the private sector, public sector employment was a cornerstone of African American class 
ascendancy in the US in the 1960s and 1970s (Laird 2017). However, as these workers retired 
or were laid off and their positions were contracted out, employment was rendered precarious, 
less well paid, or simply unfulfilled. The loss of government jobs has been a contributor to 
growth of the racial wage gap. In 1979, black men’s average hourly salary was 22% lower than 
that of white men. By 2015, the gap had grown to 31% (Redden and Kasperkevic 2015). MTA’s 
financial precarity, maintenance crisis, and environmental vulnerability disproportionately 
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impacts the everyday lives of people of color, and increased debt service will increase pressure 
to make cuts elsewhere, most likely on the salary and benefits of a workforce that is 
disproportionately comprised of people of color.   
 
Meanwhile, capital spending activities are unevenly distributed. Work continues on the 
massively expensive Hudson Yards extension that will primarily serve new corporate banking 
headquarters in west Manhattan. While cost estimates to shore up the subway in the next ten 
years come in around $40 billion, the proposed responses have been insufficient, piecemeal, 
and often regressive. The newest initiative would see the introduction of a congestion charge 
levied on cars entering the CBD, with proceeds ring-fenced mostly for the subway. The new fee 
is projected to raise $US800 million to US$1.5 billion annually over the next decade, but 
importantly, advocates note that the revenue could be leveraged into further bond issuances 
worth as much as 17 times the value of the congestion charge (Fitzsimmons 2018). Further, as 
Huber (2016) has shown, tying environmental funding to dedicated revenue sources, rather than 
drawing from general state obligations that can be funded through progressive taxation is risky 
because those mechanisms are easily reversed and can experience wild swings. 
 
In Cape Town, the city’s water crisis called attention to the complex financial and social 
dynamics associated with climate change in a city marked by deeply racialized inequality just as 
the crisis of mobility has in New York. Cross-subsidization of poor households is a critical 
component of municipal policy in South Africa, and the city is committed to some forms of 
redistribution through tariffs. These mechanisms are stretched beyond limit by shifting tariff 
structures in the wake of drought-induced scarcity, however, and uncertainty is heightened by 
the sheer intensity of the city’s inequality. Debt recovery and demand management have 
converged to create a situation in which poor households face financial uncertainty as well as 
regularized water scarcity due to changes in water pricing and indigent access.   
 
This differentiated exposure to risk is entrenched by green debt through the continued 
deployment of WMDs as means of conjoined demand reduction and debt recovery. The need to 
recover costs has come to be framed not through a lack of funding but rather on purported non-
payment, with the ultimate effect that new water demand management strategies are ultimately 
punitive. Municipalities need to cover costs through payments made by users of municipal 
services, who are one of the primary sources of revenue for the city. This has been primarily 
accomplished in Cape Town through the deployment of WMDs and the reconfiguring of Free 
Basic Water, both of which prioritize debt recovery over service delivery. WMDs can increase 
vulnerability for poor households given the difficulties in registering as indigent, the result of 
which would be that extremely poor households pay a disproportionate household cost on 
water. The linkage between debt recovery, demand management, and climate change 
adaptation threatens to deepen processes of uneven water access in the city by shifting the 
valuation of water and heightening the comparative burden onto poor households (See Yates & 
Harris 2018). This has implications not just for water but for municipal services more broadly, as 
South African cities continue to face the challenge of finding ways to fund redistribution in the 
context of economic slowdown and climatic uncertainty.  
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Green debt adds one more layer to this matrix, linking efforts to reduce household indebtedness 
to the issuance of debt at the municipal level. Critically, Cape Town’s debt was not used to fund 
new expansive infrastructures for decarbonizing water provisioning or leveling access, but 
rather formed a component of a broader strategy to manage demand through technological 
means. Climate debt in this case mirrors ongoing dynamics of austerity but adds a layer of risk 
given the city’s dependency on tariffs to fund its operations. These include other social services 





The climate crisis is here, and the political and social infrastructures to respond have not yet 
been created. Debt is one of the few mechanisms that municipalities have for attempting to 
manage the financial and ecological crises magnified by climate change. Increasingly this debt 
is carrying explicitly environmental aspirations, codified through mechanisms designed to 
ensure that finance is targeted for environmental outcomes. Money managers are, in the words 
of the Financial Times, “the new warriors of climate change” (Raval & Mooney, 2018), and are 
becoming the arbiters for what types of responses to climate change are fundable, at what 
scale, and where. We worry that not only are these new warriors ill equipped, but that their 
tactics produce unacceptable collateral damage, particularly among those least responsible for, 
but most vulnerable to, conditions that have been produced through the operations of racial 
capitalism.      
 
We want to highlight the ways that climate finance yields increasingly dangerous geographies 
for urbanites subject to racialized austerity and environmental change. Municipal green finance 
is framed as a mechanism for enabling sustainable transitions, but it is structured through 
existing racialized geographies of inequality. We call for further engagement with climate debt to 
understand municipal governance in climate crisis and to contest austerity. Conceptually, by 
drawing together Cape Town and New York City, we highlight the need for fine-grained, 
comparative analysis of racial capitalism in distant cities to understand the relational 
geographies of climate change and associated patterns of differentiated adaptation. 
 
If, as Kate Aronoff (2018) has proposed, the choice that confronts us is not between 
transitioning to a future of climate change or not, but between a just transition or one led by and 
for elites, we must illuminate how the latter is already playing out. As we have demonstrated, 
municipal debt, whether green or not, serves to aggravate entrenched inequality and displace 
environmental and financial risks onto those least able to bear them. While we would challenge 
municipal finance and planning offices to radically reconsider priorities and the types of 
programs that are earmarked for funding, our concern is primarily located with higher order 
political scales where borrowing and redistribution can create more progressive and broad-
based socialities of risk (Christophers et al, 2018). WMDs are no more the just solution for Cape 
Town than rising transit fares for business-as-usual service is for New York. Instead, federal 
officials and multilateral pools of capital must make large volumes of concessionary money 
available for creative, huge, and democratic interventions in cities that will reduce risks for the 
   
 
19 
many who are least able to manage them. This could take any number of forms. In the United 
States, the UK, and some countries in Western Europe, discussions about a Green New Deal 
are heating up and reflect many of the concerns we have raised here, particularly in emphasis 
on municipal adaptations and a focus on derisking social, political, and economic life for 
vulnerable communities (e.g. Ocasio-Cortez, 2019). However, producing new regimes of risk 
that are more equitably distributed in cities in the Global South may prove even more 
challenging as central governments lack many of the fiscal tools at the scale of northern 
counterparts. Indeed, enabling cities in the South to raise municipal debt for adaptation is one of 
the primary directions of travel for multilateral development banks (World Bank, n.d.).  
 
Our analysis demands a fundamentally different approach, one that would account for the 
intrinsic inequities reflected in how climate change is differentially experienced across scales 
(See Ranganathan & Bratman, 2019). For example, academics and activists must keep the 
notion of ‘climate debt’ squarely located as a critique that recognizes how rich countries have 
incurred vast overdrafts on the atmosphere and must compensate for the losses and damages 
they produce. Ideally, compensation would be compounded by the repatriation of capital stolen 
through colonialism and extorted through dizzyingly unfair terms of trade that continues today 
(Hickel 2017).  
 
Barring this more radical solution, cities in the South must still be given access to vast pools of 
money in a way that reflects their historically-produced, structurally disadvantaged position. 
There is no need to reinvent the wheel; capital could flow through existing institutions whose 
missions would be shifted away from facilitating profit-oriented investment. For example, the 
Green Climate Fund must be capitalized fully, then those funds disbursed as direct investment 
rather than as leveraging capital that merely facilitates expanded borrowing for the Global South 
and expanded rent capture for northern investors. Indeed, multilateral capital flows for 
adaptation by and large reflect the New Washington Consensus preference for subsidizing 
investors in the name of leveraging private capital (Mitchell & Sparke 2016).  
 
The expansion of leveraged multilateral flows in the South or municipal borrowing in the North 
both serve to entrench extant regimes of financial and environmental risk for non-elites, and 
particularly marginalized communities. This critique is applicable to the field of ‘green finance’, 
or even the ‘green economy’ more broadly, as financiers and states grasp with increasing 
desperation for business-as-usual solutions to capital’s socio-ecological contradictions. Thus 
far, climate-financial interventions to slow the pace of environmental degradation or prepare 
communities for new climate realities have largely failed; our research demonstrates how new 
risks are produced and distributed through financial interventions, rather than ameliorated.  
Producing new and, more egalitarian regimes of risk is critical if we want to avoid discovering 
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